Root cause analysis: getting past the first plausible answer
Root cause analysis works out why something went wrong deeply enough that fixing it prevents a recurrence. Its main difficulty is stopping too early, at an answer that sounds satisfying.
An information security policy states what you protect, who is responsible, and what everyone has to do. Copied from a template it is a liability; written honestly it is a page people actually follow.
An information security policy is the document that says what information your company protects, who is accountable for protecting it, and what each person has to do. It sits above the specific rules — passwords, devices, access, suppliers — and gives them a reason to exist. In a large organisation it is one document in a stack of forty. In a company of twenty it can be two pages, and two pages that people follow beat forty nobody has opened.
Most small companies acquire one for an external reason: a customer questionnaire, an insurance form, a certification. That is a legitimate trigger, but it produces the characteristic failure — a downloaded template with the company name substituted, describing controls that do not exist. That document is worse than nothing, because it is now evidence that you claimed something untrue.
The most valuable clause is the one about reporting mistakes. If someone who clicks a phishing link expects trouble, they will say nothing for three days, and those three days are the whole difference between an incident and a disaster. Say plainly that prompt reporting is expected and never punished — then honour it the first time it happens, because that is when the policy is really written.
Every claim in a security policy is a claim you may have to demonstrate — to a customer, an auditor, an insurer, or in the aftermath of a breach. A policy stating that access is reviewed quarterly, in a company that has never reviewed it, is not a statement of intent. It is a documented failure to follow your own process, which is a materially worse position than never having claimed it.
The honest approach is to write what you do now, mark what you intend to do with a date, and revisit. A one-page policy describing real practice is more defensible in every direction than a comprehensive one describing aspirations.
If you are working towards a certification such as ISO 27001, the policy is one required element of a wider management system, and the standard specifies what it must contain. Data protection law imposes its own obligations independently of any certification. Neither is satisfied by a policy document alone, and neither should be approached by editing a template found online — where a specific regime applies to you, follow it, and take advice on the parts that determine liability.
For a small company with no certification pressure, none of that removes the value of the two-page version. The controls it describes are the ones that prevent the incidents small companies actually have: an account nobody closed, a shared password, a laptop with no encryption, a supplier holding data nobody assessed.
Ettex Docs is where the document itself belongs: version history so the policy in force last March is still readable, comments to collect review feedback before publishing, and one shared link so there is a single current version rather than copies in inboxes. The related policies — access, devices, retention — sit alongside it and get reviewed on the same cycle.
It is a document tool, not a compliance platform. It does not track control implementation, collect evidence, map clauses to a standard, or manage an audit. If you need those, that is a different category of product; what belongs here is the writing, the review and the record of what was agreed when.
A document stating what information the organisation protects, who is accountable, and what everyone must do — the umbrella above specific rules on access, devices and suppliers.
Two pages is enough for a small company. Length is not a measure of rigour, and unread policies protect nobody.
As a structure, yes. As finished text, no — a policy describing controls you do not operate is evidence against you rather than for you.
The one saying incidents must be reported immediately and that prompt reporting is never punished. Delay is what turns incidents into disasters.
No. The standard requires a management system with defined controls and evidence; the policy is one element of it.
At least annually, plus after any incident or significant change, with the change recorded.
Write what is actually true, name one accountable person, make incident reporting safe, and keep it to a length people will read.
Root cause analysis works out why something went wrong deeply enough that fixing it prevents a recurrence. Its main difficulty is stopping too early, at an answer that sounds satisfying.
A code of conduct says how people here are expected to behave and what happens when they do not. Its value is not aspiration — it is having decided the hard cases before one arrives.
A project charter names the objective, the boundaries, the sponsor and the person authorised to run the work. Its main use comes months later, when people disagree about what was agreed.